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SELF-DEFENSE
Paul C. Giannelli
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W Weatherhead
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
A number of affirmative defenses sanction the use of
force. Self defense is the most common and the most important of these defenses. Related defenses include defense of others, defense of a dwelling, and defense of property. Generally, these defenses are controlled by the com·> mon law. Burdens of proof, however, are specified by
·~ statute. In addition, the legislature has enacted a provision
on the admissibility of evidence of the battered woman syn··; drome in self-defense cases.
-'

ElEMENTS OF SElF-DEFENSE
A claim of self-defense is typically raised in crimes
against the person - murder, manslaughter, attempted
murder, aggravated assault, and assault. See also United
States v: Panter, 688 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1982) (defense of
.· , self-protection valid where convicted felon who reasonably
tl ,eared for his safety took possession of a firearm and was
charged with a statute making it a crime for a convicted
felon to possess a firearm).
The basis of self-defense is the perceived necessity of
the use of force to protect oneself. An 1876 Ohio case observes that "the taking of life in defense of one's person cannot be either justified or excused, except on the ground of
necessity; and that such necessity must be imminent at the
time; and ... no man can avail himself of such necessity if
he brings it upon himself." Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186,
199 (1876).
The genesis of the law of self-defense in Ohio can be
traced back to the 19th Century. In Marts v. State, 26 Ohio
St. 162, 167-68 (1875), the Ohio Supreme Court established the requirements for self-defense:
Homicide is justifiable on the ground of self-defense,
where the slayer, in the careful and proper use of his
faculties, bona fide believes, and has reasonable
ground to believe, that he is in imminent danger of
death or great bodily harm, and that his only means of
escape from such danger will be by taking the life of
his assailant, although in fact he is mistaken as to the
existence or imminence of the danger. The fact of the
existence of such danger is not an indispensable requirement.

Over 100 years later, in State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15,
20-21, 381 N.E.2d 195 (1978), the Court again set forth the
elements of self-defense:
To establish self-defense, the following elements must
be shown: (1) the slayer was not at fault in creating the
situation giving rise to the affray; (2) the slayer has a
bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of
death or great bodily harm and that his only means of
escape from such danger was in the use of such force;
and (3) the slayer must not have violated any duty to
retreat or avoid the danger.
The Court has consistently adhered to the Melchior statement of the elements of self-defense in later cases. E.g.,
State v. Williford, 49 Ohio St.3d 247,249, 551 N.E.2d 1279
(1990); State v. Jackson, 22 Ohio St.3d 281, 283, 490
N.E.2d 893 (1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987); State
v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 80, 388 N.E.2d 755 (1979).
The elements of self-defense specified in Melchior, however, differ from the elements in Marts in some important respects. The second element of the Me/choir definition does
not require that the defendant's belief be "reasonable," as
does Marts. Similarly, Marts fails to specify a duty to retreat,
which is the third element of Me/choir. These differences
are discussed below.
NONDEADlY FORCE
A person who is without fault may defend himself with the
use of nondeadly force. 1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive
Criminal Law§ 5.7(b), at 651 (1986). The degree of force
depends on what appears reasonably necessary to protect
that person from the imminent use of unlawful force.
'Therefore, even when faced with less than impending
death or great physical harm, one may use reasonable force
in order to protect oneself." State v. Fox, 36 Ohio App.3d 78,
80, 520 N.E.2d 1390 (1987). See also City of Akron v.
Oakes, 31 Ohio App.3d 24, 507 N.E.2d 1158 (1986) ("[O]ne
may use such force as the circumstances require to protect
oneself against such danger as one has good reason to apprehend. Thus, even when faced with less than impending
death or great physical harm, one may use reasonable force
in order to protect oneself against a perceived danger:');
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State v. Morris, 8 Ohio App.3d 12, 19, 455 N.E.2d 1352
(1982) ("Defense counsel argued self-defense for each of
the assaults, and the trial judge expressly acquitted defendant of ... the charge relating to the first assaultive involvement on that ground."); State v. Mcleod, 82 Ohio App. 155,
157, 80 N.E.2d 699 (1948) (assault & battery case) ("In
general, every man has the right to defend himself and his
property by the use of such force as circumstances require
to protect himself against such danger as he has good reason to apprehend.").
Thus, in a simple assault case, an accused is justified in
using force "against the imminent use of unlawful force as
long as it was not likely to cause death or great bodily
harm." Columbus v. Dawson, 33 Ohio App.3d 141, 142, 514
N.E.2d 908 (1986).

Subjective test
The drafters of the Model Penal Code, however, disagreed with the majority view; they required only an honest
(subjective) belief. Model Penal Code § 3.04(1 ). The
Code's drafters believed that a defendant who had an han- ,
est but mistaken belief (even an unreasonable one) should
not be held liable for murder, although the defendant-might
be guilty of a lesser offense, such as manslaughter.
Compare, for example, the actor who purposely kills in
order to reap financial reward and the actor who purposely kills while believing in the existence of circumstances that would, if they actually existed, exonerate
on self-defense grounds. If the second actor was mistaken - if the circumstances were not in fact as he believed-them to be - it is unjust to view him as having
the same level of culpability as the first actor. It is unjust to put him at thatlevel even if he was negligent [unreasonable] or reckless in forming his belief, though to
be sure in.that case it would be appropriate to view him
as culpable . . . . If the actor was reckless or negligent
as to the existence of circumstances that would justify
his conduct, he should then be subject to conviction
of a crime for which recklessness or negligence, as
the case may be, is otherwise sufficient to establish
culpability. American Law Institute, Model P~nal Code
and Commentaries 36 (1985).
Few jurisdictions follow this purely subjective approach, although some othei jurisdictions recognize vJhat is described
as "imperfect self-defense.'' 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.7(c), at
655. Under this concept; an unreasonable but sincere (good
faith) belief in the necessity of the use of deadly force mitigates the crime from murder to manslaughter. 1 LaFave &
Scott, § 5. 7(i), at 663.
Ohio Rule. The early Ohio cases followed the objective
rule. In Marts v. State, 26 Ohio St. 162, 167 (1 875), the
Ohio Supreme Court held that the defender must have a
"reasonable ground to believe" that he is in danger. Ohio
Jury Instruction 41 1.33 reflects this position.
Inexplicably, the Ohio Supreme Court has omitted the
reasonableness requirement in outlining the elements of
self-defense in recent cases. These cases state the require
ment as follows: "the slayer had a bona fide belief that he
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.''
State v. Jackson, 22 Ohio St.3d 281, 282, 490 N.E.2d 893
(1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987). Accord State v.
Williford, 49 Ohio St.3d 247, 249, 551 N.E.2d 1279 (1990);
State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 80, 388 N.E.2d 755
(1979); State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15, 21,381 N.E.2d
195 (1978).
Accordingly, in State v. Thomas, 13 Ohio App.3d 211, 213
468 N.E.2d 763 (1983), the appellate court wrote that "the
test is a subjective one, relating to the particular defendant
seeking to prove the defense." In that case the court reversed the murder conviction of a woman because the testimony of her psychologist regarding her paranoid personality
was erroneously excluded at trial. The court commented:
[l]t is not difficult to perceive that a paranoid personality, who viewed everything negatively, might interpret
the danger presented by an advancing individual differently than an ordinary person would interpret such
danger. To that extent, some of the testimony would
be an aid to the jury in regard to the determination it
was required to make regarding this particular defendant's mind.

DEADLY FORCE
The use of deadly force, of course, requires greater justification. The defendant must reasonably believe that he is in
danger of death or great bodily injury. In State v. Stewart, 1
Ohio St. 66, 75 (1852), the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the
view that deadly force could be used to repel any attack,
even a nonlethal one: "If this is so, a man upon whom an ordinary assault and battery is committed may pierce his assailant with a sword, or knock him down with an axe, for each
of these is a weapon 'sufficient to resist the force employed.'
We do not think such is the law.'' In short, a person may generaiiy use deadiy force to repei deadly force. However, deadly force may be justified even when the assailant is unarmed
-for example, a small woman may be justified in using
deadly force against an unarmed attacker who is much larger. 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.7(b), at 653 ("[A]ccount must be
taken of the respective sizes and sex of the assailant and defendant, of the presence of multiple assailants, and the especially violent nature of the unarmed attack.'').
The key is the reasonableness of the defender's conduct:
"[l]t is only when one uses a greater degree of force than is
necessary under all the circumstances that it is not justifiable on the ground of self-defense .... The law does not
require of the defendant any nice distinction as to the least
amount of force necessary, but whether the force used was
excessive is a question for the trier of facts." State v.
Mcleod, 82 Ohio App. 155, 157, 80 N.E.2d 699 (1948) (assault & battery case).
REASONABLE BELIEF IN NECESSITY OF FORCE
The majority rule in this country requires the defendant to
have an honest and reasonable belief in the existence and
imminence of the danger. As the United States Supreme
Court commented, "[f]he question for the jury was whether,
without fleeing from his adversary, he had, at the moment
he struck the deceased, reasonable grounds to believe, and
in good faith believed, that he could not save his life or protect himself from great bodily harm except by doing what he
did.'' Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 560 (1895). In
other words, it is not enough that the belief be held in good
faith (a subjective belief); the belief also must be reasonable, which incorporates an objective standard. "[T]he case
law and statutory law on self-defense generally require that
the defendant's belief in the necessity of using force to prevent harm to himself be a reasonable one, so that one who
honestly though unreasonably believes in the necessity of
using force in self-protection loses the defense." 1 LaFave &
Scott, § 5.7(c), at 653-54.
2

Citing Thomas, the Supreme Court in State v. Koss, 49 Ohio
St.3d 213, 215, 551 N.E.2d 970 (1990), wrote: "Thus, Ohio
has adopted a subjective test in determining whether a particular defendant properly acted in self defense:· The Court,
f" however, went on to say that the trial judge had properly in·. tJ structed the jury. That instruction commenced with the
phrase: "In determining whether the Defendant had reasonable grounds for an honest belief that she was in imminent
danger:' ld. at 216. The term "reasonable grounds" is the
key aspect of an objective standard. In addition, Marts
which adopted the objective approach is often cited approvingly in recent Supreme Court cases, as is State v.
Champion, 109 Ohio St. 281,283, 142 N.E. 141 (1924). In
Champion the Court wrote that the defendant "must have
'reasonable grounds' for such bona fide belief:'
Recently, the Court once again cited the subjective factor
but then added the following sentence: "The defendant is
privileged to use that force which is reasonably necessary
to repel the attack." State v. Williford, 49 Ohio St.3d 247,
249, 551 N.E.2d 1279 (1990).
The confusion on this issue may res_ult from failing to
recognize a middle ground between a purely subjective
state of mind and a totally objective (reasonable person)
standard. The intermediate position would require evaluation of the reasonableness of the belief from the defendant's
point of view. As one court has written, the test is "not reasonable as to a reasonable man, but reasonable as to the

There are, however, limitations on this approach. For example, voluntary intoxication is not recognized as a legitimate consideration in this context. "One who because of
voluntary intoxication thinks that he is in danger of imminent
attack, though a sober man would not have thought so,
does not have the reasonable belief which the law requires."
1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.7(c), at 654.
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EVIDENCE ISSUES: STATE OF MIND
Threats
In raising a self-defense claim, ·~he defendant may introduce proof of the victim's threats against her in order to establish her belief that she was in danger at the time of the
killing:' State v. Randle, 69 Ohio App.2d 71, 73, 430 N.E.2d
951 (1980) ("Inherent within the right to offer evidence of
threats of violence putting the defendant in fear of her life is
proof of the reason for the threats to be made:').
Communicated character. In addition to threats, evidence of the victim's violent character is relevant to show
that the accused reasonably believed that he was in danger
of death or grievous bodily injury:
. On the trial of an indictment for murder, the prisoner
may, for the purpose of showing that the homicide was
justifiable on the ground of self-defense, prove that the
deceased was a person of violent, vicious, and dangerous character, and that character was known to the
prisoner at the time of the recontre between them.
Marts v. State, 26 Ohio St. 162 (1875) (syllabus, para.
1).
Accord McGaw v. State, 123 Ohio St. 196, 201, 174 N.E.
741 (1931) (approving Marts); State v. Roderick, 77 Ohio St.
301, 307, 82 N.E. 1082 (1907) ("It is conceded that in cases
of self-defense it is competent for the defendant to prove the
violent and dangerous character of the deceased at the time
of the commission of the crime, if such character was then
known to him."); Upthegrove v. State, 37 Ohio St. 662, 662
(1882) (syllabus) ("[l]t is competent for the defense to prove
that the general reputation of the prosecuting witness was
that of a violent and dangerous man, and that such general
reputation was known to the accused at the time of the assault, as tending to support the plea of self-defense:').
The law is summarized in State v. Smith, 10 Ohio App.3d
99, 101 460 N.E.2d 693 (1983):
The deceased's admission to defendant that he had
killed a person, her personal knowledge of violent attacks by the deceased upon others, and her knowledge through hearsay that the deceased had committed an unprovoked act of violence upon another, were
all evidence relevant to defendant's belief that she was
in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and
were admissible to prove her state of mind.
Evidence concerning the victim's violent character (reputation, opinion, or specific acts) is admissible if known to the
accused. See State v. Carlson, 31 Ohio App.3d 72, 73, 508
N.E.2d 999 (1986) ("A defendant, when arguing self-defense, may testify about specific instances of the victim's
prior conduct in order to establish the defendant's state of
mind. These events ... tend to show why the defendant believed that victim would kill or severely injure him."); 1
Giannelli & Snyder, Ohio Evidence § 404.6 (3d ed 1996).
Character evidence may also be admissible for a different
purpose- to establish the victim as the first aggressor, a
subject discussed later in this article.
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142 (1965). This would appear to be the Supreme Court's
position in State v. Sheets, 115 Ohio St. 308,310, 152 N.E.
664 (1926), in which an instruction concerning "any man of
. , ordinary prudence" was found to be defective. The Sheets
~ & Court noted: "In the Marts case ... [the] self-defense justification is placed on the grounds of the bona fides of defendant's belief, and reasonableness therefor, and whether,
under the circumstances, he exercised a careful and proper
use of his own faculties." Thus, a later court interpreting
Sheets wrote:
[T]he conduct of any individual is to be measured by
that individual's equipment mentally and physically. He
may act in self-defense, not only when a reasonable
person would so act, but when one with the particular
qualities that the individual himself has would so do. A
nervous, timid, easily frightened individual is not measured by the same standard that a stronger, calmer,
and braver man might be. Nelson v. State, 42 Ohio
App. 252, 254, 181 N.E. 448 (1932) (The defendant
was 60 years of age and quite infirm).
See also State v. Cope, 78 Ohio App. 429,437, 67 N.E.2d
912 (1946) (''The true test is whether the particular person
on trial believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that
he was in danger:').
This intermediate position is perhaps best captured in
Ohio Jury Instruction 411.33(2):
In determining whether the defendant had reasonable
grounds for an honest belief that he was in imminent
danger, you must put yourselves in the position of this
defendant, with his characteristics, his knowledge or
lack of knowledge, and under the circumstances and
• (t
1
conditions that surrounded him at that time. You must
consider the conduct of [the victim] and determine if
his acts and words caused the defendant to reasonably and honestly believe that he was about to be killed
or to receive great bodily injury.

3

MISTAKEN BELIEF
The necessity perceived by the defender need not be actual; it is sufficient that the defender demonstrate reasonable grounds for this perception. 'When his belief is reasonable, however, he may be mistaken in his belief and still
have the defense:' 1 LaFave & Scott,§ 5.7(c), at 654. As an
early Ohio case observed:
It is not ... necessary that the danger should prove
real, or in fact exist, for, whether real or apparent, if the
circumstances are such as to induce a belief, reasonable and well grounded, that life is in peril, or that grievous bodily harm is impending, the party threatened
with the danger may act upon appearances and slay
his assailant. Darling v. Williams, 35 Ohio St. 58, 6263 (1898).
See also Marcoguiseppe v. State, 114 Ohio St. 299, 301,
151 N.E. 182 (1926) (Self-defense is a valid defense "although in fact he is mistaken as to the existence or imminence of the danger."); Marts v. State, 26 Ohio St. 162, 16768 (1875) ("Homicide is justifiable on the ground of self defense ... although in fact he is mistaken as to the existence
or imminence of the danger. The fact of the existence of
such danger is not an indispensable requirement.").
This position is often justified by citing Justice Holmes' famous expression: "Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife." Brown v. United
States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).

feared assault from decedent."
Generally, the reasonable ground requirement is not satisfied by threats of future harm as distinguished from imminent harm. Also, "[v]ile or abusive language, or verbal
threats, no matter how provocative, do not justify an assault
or the use of a deadly weapon." Ohio Jury Instructions § ·
411.33(1).
Battered Woman Syndrome
The battered woman syndrome (BWS) describes a pattern of violence inflicted on a woman by her mate. See
generally 1 Giannelli & lmwinkelried, Scientific Evidence ch.
9 (2d ed. 1993). Dr. Lenore Walker, a leading researcher in
this field, describes a battered woman as follows:
A battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he
wants her to do without any concern for her rights.
Battered women include wives or women in any form
of intimate relationships with men. Furthermore, in
order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple
must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any
woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with
a man once. lf.it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman. Walker, The Battered Woman xv (1979).
The violence associated with this type of relationship is neither constant nor random. Instead, it follows a pattern. Dr.
Walker has identified a three stage cycle of violence. The
first stage is the ''tension building" phase, during which small
abusive episodes occur. These episodes gradually escalate
over a period of time. The tension continues to build until thE
second stage -the "acute battering" phase - erupts.
During this phase, in Which most injuries occur, the battering
is out of control. Psychological abuse in the form of threats
of future harm is also prevalent. The third phase is a calm
loving period in which the batterer is contrite, seeks forgiveness, and promises to refrain from future violence. This
phase provides a positive reinforcement for the woman to
continue the relationship in the hope that the violent behavio
will not recur. The cycle then repeats itself. Id. at 65-70.
In State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St.2d 518, 521-22,423
N.E.2d 137 (1981 ), the Ohio Supreme Court, one of the firs
courts to consider the issue, rejected BWS evidence.
Expert testimony on the "battered wife syndrome" by
a psychiatric social worker to support defendant's
claim of self-defense is inadmissible herein because
(1) it is irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of
whether defendant acted in self-defense at the time of
the shooting; (2) the subject of the expert testimony is
within the understanding of the jury; (3) the "battered
wife syndrome" is not sufficiently developed, as a matter of commonly accepted scientific knowledge, to warrant testimony under the guise of expertise; and (4) its
prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value.
Most courts in other jurisdictions that considered the issue
after Thomas adopted the opposing view. According to om
court, "[o]nly by understanding these unique pressures that
force battered women to remain with their mates, despite
their long-standing and reasonable fear of severe bodily
harm and the isolation that being a battered woman create!
can a battered woman's state of mind be accurately and
fairly understood:' State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J.
1984). Another court wrote:
[T]he theory underlying the battered woman's syn-

ACCIDENTAL KILLING OF A THIRD PARTY
A person who is exercising the right to self-defense is not
criminally responsible for the accidental injury to a third
par-ty. See 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.7(g). The test for culpability is "whether the killing would have been justifiable if the
accused had killed the person whom he intended to kill, as
the unintended act derives its character from the intended."
State v. Clifton, 32 Ohio App.2d 284, 287, 290 N.E.2d 921
(1972) ("[T]he court erred in refusing to include an instruction that if the jury found that the accused was acting in selfdefense when he fired the shot that killed James Hargrove,
he would be entitled to acquittal even though Hargrove was
not the assailant.").
IMMINENCE REQUIREMENT
A claim of self-defense requires an imminent attack. See
Marts v. State, 26 Ohio St. 162 (1875) (syllabus, para. 2)
("Homicide is justifiable on the ground of self-defense,
where the slayer ... , in the careful and proper use of his
faculties, bona fide believes, and has reasonable ground to
believe, that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm."); Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199 (1876) ("such
necessity must be imminent at the time"); Stewart v. State, 1
Ohio St. 66, 73 (1852) ('We find no evidence tending to
prove that Stewart, when he slew Dotey, was in danger of
loss of life, or limb, or of great bodily harm, or that he apprehended such danger.").
Unless the threat is imminent, the necessity for resorting
to force is absent. For example, in State v. Rogers, 43 Ohio
St.2d 28, 31, 330 N.E.2d 67 4 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1061 (1976), the Court held that a self-defense instruction
was not required because the record was devoid of any evidence ''that the decedent committed an overt act by which
appellant could reasonably, and in good faith, believe that
he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.
Rather, appellant ... failed to present evidence that he
4

drome has indeed passed beyond the experimental
stage and gained a substantial enough scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility. . . . [N]umerous articles and books have been published about the battered woman's syndrome; and recent findings of rer
1/J
searchers in the field have confirmed its presence and
thereby indicated that the scientific community accepts
its underlying premises. People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d
358, 363 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
In State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d 213, 217, 551 N.E.2d 970
(1990), the Supreme Court reversed Thomas: 'We believe
that the battered woman syndrome has gained substantial
scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility:• The Court
noted that the "admission of expert testimony regarding the
battered woman syndrome does not establish a new defense or justification. Rather, it is to assist the trier of fact in
determining whether the defendant acted out of an honest
belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great
bodily harm and that the use of such force was her only
means of escape:•
Adopted in 1990, R.C. Section 2901.06 provides for the
admission of evidence of the battered woman syndrome.
Subdivision (B) provides that a self-defense claim may be
supported by "expert testimony of the 'battered woman syndrome' and expert testimony that the person suffered from
that syndrome as evidence to establish the requisite belief
of an imminent danger of death or great bodily harm:' See
also R.C. 2945.392 (admissibility of battered vvoman syndrome evidence in insanity cases).

See also Graham v. State, 98 Ohio St. 77, 79, 120 N.E. 232
(1918) ("[l]f the defendant did not provoke the assault, but
while in the lawful pursuit of his business was suddenly and
violently assaulted with a deadly weapon and placed in danger of loss of life or great bodily harm, under the current
modern authority he was not required to retreat.").
By 1975, however, the retreat rule was cited as an element of self defense. In State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15,
21, 381 N.E.2d 195 (1978), the Court set forth a retreat requirement as an element of self-defense: "the slayer must
not have violated any duty to retreat or avoid the danger."
This requirement was repeated in State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio
St.2d 74, 80,388 N.E.2d 755 (1979) ("[A]ppellant had many
opportunities to retreat and avoid danger, which he failed to
do."), and applied in State v. Jackson, 22 Ohio St. 3d 281,
283-84, 490 N.E.2d 893 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917
(1987), where the Court stated:
[A]ppellant's proposed instruction states in essence
that as long as a person is in any place where he has
a right to be, there is no duty to retreat from an attack.
... [U]nder appellant's instruction any one in a public
place, or any invitee or licensee, would be in a place
where he has a right to be and would thus have no
duty to retreat. This instruction is clearly an overbroad
and incorrect statement of law on the duty to retreat as
set forth in Robbins ... which incorporates exceptions
to the duty to retreat only when one is in his home or
business.
See also Ohio Jury Instructions§ 411.31{2).
More recently, in State v. Williford, 49 Ohio St.3d 247,
250, 551 N.E.2d 1279 (1990), the Court noted that in "most
circumstances, a person may not kill in self-defense if he
has available a reasonable means of retreat from the confrontation." The Court went on to say, that in '~he instant
case, there was testimony that the confrontation took place
inside appellee's house and on appellee's porch. Because
the jury was not instructed on the Peacock rule [see infra], it
might have believed that appellee was under a duty to retreat from his home. It was therefore error for the court to
fail to give this instruction:' ld. The Court went on to declare,
however, that '~here is no duty to retreat from one's home."
ld. at 250.

DUTY TO RETREAT
(i (f
A majority of American jurisdictions do not require a de, ' fender to retreat, even if he can do so safely, before resorting to the use of deadly force. 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.7(f), at
659. A strong minority, however, impose such a requirement, often stated as the duty to "retreat to the wall:' The
rationale underlying the retreat requirement was succinctly
stated by the drafters of the Model Penal Code:
It rests, of course, upon the view that the protection of
life has such a high place in a proper scheme of social
values that the law should not permit conduct that
places life in jeopardy, when the necessity for doing so
can be avoided by the sacrifice of the much smaller
value that inheres in standing up to an aggression. To
the argument that retreat is cowardly and dishonorable, the answer embraced has been that of Beale: "A
really honorable man, a man of truly refined and elevated feeling, would perhaps always regret the apparent cowardice of a retreat, but he would regret ten
times more, after the excitement of the contest was
past, the thought that he had the blood of a fellowbeing on his hands." American Law Institute, Model
Penal Code and Commentaries 54 (1985).
The early Ohio cases did not appear to require retreat. In
Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 99-100 (1876), the Ohio
Supreme Court wrote:
Does the law hold a man who is violently and feloniously assaulted responsible for having brought such
r. (
necessity upon himself, on the sole ground that he
failed to fly from his assailant when he might have
done so? ... [A] true man, who is without fault, is not
obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by violence or
surprise maliciously seeks to take his life or do him
enormous bodily harm.

State v. Peacock
State v. Peacock, 40 Ohio St. 333, 334 (1883), has been
cited both as requiring a duty to retreat and for recognizing
an exception to that duty for an attack in the defender's
home. Peacock, however, does not explicitly impose a duty
to retreat. Thus, the Court in Williford noted that such a duty
was "implicit" in Peacock. Williford, 49 Ohio St.3d at 250.
As noted above, however, cases both before and after
Peacock, explicitly rejected the retreat rule. E.g., Ervin
(1876); Graham (1918).
See also State v. Jackson, 22 Ohio St.3d 281, 283, 490
N.E.2d 893 (1986) (''The Peacock and Graham cases state,
respectively, that one has no duty to retreat if he is assaulted in his home or business."), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917,
(1987); State v. Reid, 3 Ohio App.2d 215, 221, 210 N.E.2d
142 (1965) ("In Ohio it is the law that where one is assaulted in his home, or the home itself is attacked, he may use
such means as are necessary to repel the assailant from
the house, or to prevent his forcible entry, or material injury
to his home, even to the taking of life:').
Exceptions
Even in a retreat jurisdiction, however, certain exceptions
5
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are recognized. The retreat rule applies only to the use of
deadly force; a defender may use norideadly force without
retreating. See Columbus v. Dawson, 33 Ohio App.3d 141,
142, 514 N.E.2d 908 (1986) ("[U]nder Ohio law, there is no
requirement that a person retreat, although possible, before
using non-deadly force."). Further, retreat is required only
when the defendant can do so in complete safety.
In addition, the courts have recognized several exceptions. First, a defender need not retreat in his home or business, except perhaps when he is the first aggressor or the
victim is a co-occupant. 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.7(f), at 660.
This rule has been extended to a tent at a camp site.
"Although this issue has not previously been addressed in
Ohio, it is the opinion of this court that, for purposes of a duty
to retreat, a tent and a home are the logical equivalent of
each other. The campsites that appellant and his family occupied and paid to use on the weekend in question were
their homes for that time period." State v. Marsh, 71 Ohio
App.3d 64, 69, 593 N.E.2d 35 (1990) ("It is well established
that a person has no duty to retreat if attacked in his home.").
Second, a police officer in the performance of his duty is
not required to retreat. 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.7(f), at 661.

dence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor is admissible ....
This provision must be read in conjunction with Evidence
Rule 405(A), which governs the permissible methods of
proving character; only reputation and opinion evidence is
permitted to prove character.
As noted earlier, evidence of the victim's violent characte1
may also be relevant to show that the accused acted reasonably, an element of self-defense that is different from the
first aggressor issue; The "reasonable belief" issue, however, does not involve the circumstantial use of character to
prove the conduct of the victim, but rather involves the use
of charaCter to prove the defendant's state of mind, and thu::
is not controlled by Rules 404 and 405. Thus, the defendan
is not limited to reputation and opinion evidence when establishing his state of mind.
If character evidence is introduced to show its effect on
the accused's state of mind, its relevance obviously depends on whether the accused was familiar with the victim's character. In contrast, if character evidence is introduced to show that the victim acted in conformity with his vi·
olent character and was therefore the first aggressor, it is irrelevant whether the accused was aware of the victim's
character. In State v. Marsh, 71 Ohio App.3d 64, 70, 593
N.E.2d 35 (1990), the court wrote:
!t is clear that a defendant may not introduce evidence
of a victim's prior specific instances of conduct to show
the defendant's state of mind unless the defendant had
knowledge of that conduct. If the defendant was not
aware of the victim's prior conduct, that conduct is irrelevant as it could not have affected the defendant's
state of mind at the time of the incident. ...
However, in the case sub judice, appellant attempted
to introduce evidence of the victim's propensity for violence to show who was the aggressor.
See also State v. Debo, 8 Ohio App.2d 325, 328, 222
N.E.2d 656 (1966) ("The evidence of communicated threats
did not preclude the admissibility of uncommunicated
threats to show animus of the deceased toward accused,
the probability of his aggression; and made it admissible to
corroborate the communicated threats."); State v. Schmidt,
65 Ohio App.2d 239, 243, 417 N.E.2d 1264 (1979) ('Where
competent evidence of character is offered for the purpose
of showing that the deceased victim was the aggressor,
such evidence is admissible, regardless of the extent of the
accused's knowledge of such character or of the particular
evidence in question.").
Wigmore stated it this way: "[The] additional element of
communication is unnecessary, for the question is what the
deceased probably did, not what the accused probably
thought the deceased was going to do. The inquiry is one of
objective occurrence, not of subjective belief." 1A Wigmore,
Evidence § 63, at 1369 (Tillers rev. 1983).

FIRST AGGRESSOR RULE
Only a defendant who "was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray" may resort to the use of
force. State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15, 20, 381 N.E.2d
195 (1 978). Accoid State v. ~Jiorgan, 100 Ohio St. 66, 71,
125 N.E. 109 (1919) ("In respect to the defendant's claim of
self-defense, it is observed that he was wholly at fault.");
State v. Stewart, 1 Ohio St. 66, 74 (1852) ("Now it does
seem clear to us that Stewart sought to bring on the affray,
that he desired to be assaulted, and intended, if assaulted,
to make ~food his previous threats of using his knife.").
The "not-at-fault'' requirement means that the defendant
must not have been the first aggressor in the incident. See
State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 80, 388 N.E.2d 755
(1979) ("[A]ppellant admitted striking the first blow and
being the aggressor."); State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15,
21, 381 N. E.2d 195 (1978) ("Defendant was clearly the aggressor:'); State v. Doty, 94 Ohio St. 258, 268, 113 N.E. 811
(1916) ("It is difficult to see how the question of self-defense
arises in this case, since the testimony disclosed that the
defendant was the aggressor."); Stoffer v. Scoffer, 15 Ohio
St. 47, 51 (1864) ("[W]hile the party who first commences a
malicious assault continues in the combat, ... although he
may be so fiercely pressed that he can not retreat or is
thrown upon the ground, or driven to the wall, he can not
justify taking the life of his adversary, however necessary it
may be to save his own; and must be deemed to have
brought it upon himself the necessity of killing his fellow
man:').
Evidence
The Ohio Rules of Evidence permit a defendant to introduce evidence of the deceased's character to establish that
the deceased was the first aggressor. See 1 Giannelli &
Snyder, Ohio Evidence § 404.6 (3d ed 1995). Evidence
Rule 404(A) generally precludes the admission of character
evidence to prove conduct on a particular occasion. The
Rule, however, recognizes several exceptions. For example,
Rule 404(A)(2) reads:
Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evi-

REVIVAL OF RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE
There are some circumstances under which a first aggressor's right of self-defense is restored.
Withdrawal
First, an aggressor who effectively withdraws from the
encounter may defend himself if subsequently attacked. In
State v. Reid, 3 Ohio App.2d 215, 220, 210 N.E.2d 142
(1965), the court stated:
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While one who first makes a malicious assault upon
another continues in the conflict which ensues, he can
not justify taking the life of his adversary, however necessary it may be to save his own, or to whatever extremity he may be reduced. But when he has succeeded in wholly withdrawing from the conflict, and in
good faith, has retreated to a place of apparent security, his right of self-defense is fully restored.
Similarly, in State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15, 21 , 381
N.E.2d 195 (1978), the Supreme Court acknowledged this
"well-recognized" exception and quoted from Wharton's
Criminal Law text:
"Even though the accused may in the first jnstance
have intentionally brought on the difficulty and provoked the occasion, yet his right of self-defense will revive and his actions will be held justifiable upon the
ground of self-defense in all cases where he has withdrawn from the affray or difficulty in good faith as far
as he possibly can, and clearly and fairly announced
his desire for peace:'
See also Stoffer v. State, 15 Ohio St. 47, 53 (1864) ("But
when he has succeeded in wholly withdrawing himself from
the contest ... he is again remitted to his right of self-defense, and may make it effectual by opposing force to
force:'); State v. Davis, 8 Ohio App.3d 205, 208, 456 N.E.2d
1256 (1 982) ("The trial judge did not say self-defense is
never available to an aggressor. The court's instruction
clearly explained that an aggressor's action may be justified
as· self-defense if he previously withdrew from the confrontation in good faith.").

can fairly be required to adduce supporting evidence:· Selfdefense is an affirmative defense, not by statutory definition,
but rather because the justification is peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendant. See State v. Williford, 49 Ohio
St.3d 247, 249, 551 N.E.2d 1279 (1990) ("Under Ohio law,
self-defense is an affirmative defense."); State v. Martin, 21
Ohio St. 3d 91, 93-94, 488 N.E.2d 166 (1986) ("This court
has long determined that self-defense is an affirmative defense .... [and] is one peculiarly within the knowledge of the
defendant, which he, not the state, may fairly be required to
prove."), aff'd, 480 U.S. 228 (1 987); State v. Seliskar, 35
Ohio St.2d 95, 96, 298 N.E.2d 582 (1 973) ("[T]he elements
of self-defense can best be established by testimony of a
defendant as none is in better position than defendant to
provide evidence to aid the jury in determining whether defendant's acts were justified.").
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
If a defendant fails to meet the burden of production, the
jury should not be instructed on self-defense. For example,
in State v. Rogers, 43 Ohio St.2d 28, 31, 330 N.E.2d 674
(1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1061 (1976), the Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's claim that an instruction was
required because "the record [was] devoid of evidence that
[defendant], out of concern for his safety, intended to shoot
the decedent ... or that the decedent committed an overt
act by which [defendant] could reasonably, and in good
faith, believe that he was in imminent danger of death or
great bodiiy harm."
The test for determining when a jury instruction is required is "whether the defendant introduced sufficient evidence, which, if believed, would raise a question in the
minds of reasonable men concerning the existence of such
issues." State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 80, 388 N.E.2d
755 (1 979) (quoting State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15, 20,
381 N.E.2d 195 (1 978) (syllabus, para. 1) ("If the evidence
generates only a mere speculation or possible doubt, such
evidence is insufficient to the affirmative defense, and submission of the issue to the jury will be unwarranted.").
The Court has "repeatedly held that a failure to object before the jury retires in accordance with the second paragraph of Grim. R. 30(A), absent plain error, constitutes a
waiver." Williford, 49 Ohio St.3d at 251.
Once an objection is made, however, the defense is not
required to proffer an instruction of the issue; an accused
has a right to expect that the trial court will give complete
jury instructions on all issues raised by the evidence. "[W]e
hold that, where the trial court fails to give a complete or
correct jury instruction on the elements of the offense
charged and the defenses thereto which are raised by the
evidence, the error is preserved for appeal when the defendant objects in accordance with the second paragraph of
Grim. R. 30(A), whether or not there has been a proffer of
written jury instructions in accordance with the first paragraph of Grim. R. 30(A)." Williford, 49 Ohio St. 3d at 252.
"Additionally, it is not realistic to expect counsel to anticipate
errors of omission or misstatements of the law in the trial
court's instructions and proffer written instructions in order
to preserve possible errors for appeal." ld.
The jury should never be instructed on the burden of production, which is a decision for the judge alone. The jury
need only be instructed on the burden of persuasion.

Escalation to deadly force
Some jurisdictions recognize a second circumstance
where self-defense is revived for a first aggressor: "A nondeadly aggressor (i.e., one who begins an encounter, using
only his fist or some nondeadly weapon) who is met with
deadly force in defense may justifiably defend himself
against the deadly attack. This is because the aggressor's
victim, by using deadly force against nondeadly aggression,
uses unlawful force." 1 LaFave & Scott,§ 5.7, at 658.
Whether Ohio follows this approach is unclear.
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BURDEN OF PRODUCTION
The term "burden of proof' encompasses both the burden
of production (i.e., the burden of coming forward with evidence), and the burden of persuasion (i.e., the burden of
convincing the trier of fact of the truth of the assertion by the
quantum of evidence that the law demands). State v.
Robinson, 47 Ohio St.2d 103, 107,351 N.E.2d 88 (1976).
The burden of production for an affirmative defense is on
the defendant. R.C. 2901.05(A). Indeed, the very concept
of an affirmative defense implies that the burden of production is on the defendant and that such a defense will not be
an issue at trial unless sufficient evidence on the issue is
admitted at trial.· Of course, this evidence may be introduced through the prosecution's case-in-chief. Graham v.
State, 98 Ohio St. 77,81-82,120 N.E. 232 (1918) ("The evidence of self-defense may come wholly from the state; but
whether the evidence comes from the defense, or from the
state supporting his lawful right of self defense, it is the duty
of the court to charge that feature of the law.").
R.C. Section 2901.05(C) defines an affirmative defense
as one that is either (1) "expressly designated" as an affirmative defense, or (2) involves "an excuse or justification
peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, on which he

BURDEN OF PERSUASION
In Ohio, the burden of persuasion for self-defense falls
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upon the accused, and the standard of proof is a preponderance of evidence. At one time, however, the allocation of the
burden of persuasion was controversial. Prior to 1974 the
common law placed the burden of persuasion with respect to
self-defense on the defendant. The standard of proof was a
preponderance of the evidence. E.g., State v. Robinson, 47
Ohio St.2d 103, 109-11 0, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976) ("Ohio common law has consistently followed the traditional rule that
self-defense must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence:'); State v. Seliskar, 35 Ohio St.2d 95, 96, 298 N.E.2d
582 (1973); State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19, 294 N.E.2d
888 (1973) ("Affirmative defenses [such as self-defense]
must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence:');
Szalkai v. State, 96 Ohio St. 36, 39, 117 N.E. 12 (1917);
State v. Vancak, 90 Ohio St. 211,214, 107 N.E. 511 (1914)
(''The accused was required to establish this plea of self defense by a preponderance of the evidence.").
~n 1974 the legislature enacted R.C. Section 2901.05(A),
wh1ch stated:
Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the burden of proof is on the prosecution. The
burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense ... is upon the accused.
~he second sentence, governing affirmative defenses, mentioned only the burden of production; it was silent on the
burden of persuasion. In State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St.2d
103, 113, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976), the Supreme Court held
t~at t~e defendant did not bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
. Since the defendant did not have the burden of persuaSion on self-defense, it would seem to follow that the burden
therefore must fall on the prosecution. That, however, was
not the case. In State v. Abner, 55 Ohio St.2d 251, 253, 379
N.E.2d 228 (1978), the Court stated: ''The holding in Robinson does not mandate instruction that the prosecution must
carry the burden of proving an absence of self-defense:'
In sum, neither party had the burden of persuasion, a
rather troublesome result should the jury find the evidence
evenly balanced. In response, the General Assembly
ame~ded the statute to assign explicitly the burden of persuasion to the defendant. Effective November 1, 1978, the
statute reads:
Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the burden of proof for all elements of the offense
is_ on the prosecution. The burden of going forward
w1th the evidence of an affirmative defense, and the
burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence
for an affirmative defense, is upon the accused.
'
. Subsequent cases have held that the burden of persuaSion for an affirmative defense is on the defendant and that
the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.
State v. Martin, 21 OhioSt.3d 91, 94,488 N.E.2d 166 (1986)
("[T]he state may constitutionally require a defendant to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the affirmative
defense of self-defense:'), aff'd, 480 U.S. 228 (1987); State v.
~~ckson, 22 O~io St.3d 281, 283, 490 N.E.2d 893 (1986)
( Due process IS not offended by placing the burden of going
forward with the affirmative defense of self-defense on the
accused pursuant to R.C. 2901.05:'), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
917 (1987); State v. Marsh, 71 Ohio App.3d 64, 68,593
N.E.2d 35 (1990) ("In Ohio, self-defense is an affirmative defense which the defendant has the burden of proving.").

"If the defendant fails to prove any one of [the] elements
by a preponderance ofthe evidence he has failed to demor
strate that he acted in self-defense." State v. Jackson, 22
Ohio St.3d 281, 284, 490 N.E.2d 893 (1986), cert. denied
480 U.S. 917 (1987).
'

Constitutionality
In Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987), the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Ohio statute thatal
locates to the defendant the burden of persuasion on selfdefense. Martin challenged the statute on due process
grounds. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. 111 re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), held that the Due
Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof ?eyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
However, in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977),
the _Court ruled that Winship was not violated by a law that
ass1gned to the defendant the burden of proving "extreme
emotional di.sturbance:· which reduced murder to
manslaughter. According to the Court, Patterson controlled
An affirmative def~nse, whether self-defense or insanity,
was not an essential element of the charged crime and,
thus, the burden of persuasion could be allocated to the de·
fendant. It did not matter that only Ohio and a few other
states had chosen to allocate this burden to the defendant.
INCONSISTENT DEFENSES
In State v. Champion, 109 Ohio St. 281, 286-87, 142 N.E
141 (1924), the Ohio Supreme Court held that the defense
of accident is inconsistent with self-defense. The Court rea
soned: ·
Self-defense presumes intentional, willful use of force
to repel force or escape force. Accidental force or
shooting is exactly the contrary, wholly unintentional
and unwillful. . . . If the evidence warrants, the defendant has a right to one request or the other. By no manner of logic, law, or legerdemain is he entitled to both.
Accord Twiman v. State, 13 Ohio Law Abs 459 (App 1933).
Nevertheless, it is possible that both defenses could
come into play. In State v. Armbrust, 35 Ohio Law Abs 554,
558, 42 N.E.2d 214 (App. 1941 ), the accused claimed that
his "possession and drawing of a weapon may be in self-de
tense, but the actual infliction of the mortal wound may be
an accident." The Armbrust court noted that although the
_Cha"!pion ~aiding "is very broad in its terms and apparent!)
IS all-mc!us1ve of any conditions:· the case was distinguishable on 1ts facts. Thus, there is some support for instructing
on both ~elf-defense and accident, given the appropriate
factual Circumstances. Accord State v. Lovejoy, 48 Misc. 20
357 N.E.2d 424 (Muni. 1976) .
. In a~other case, the Ohio Supreme Court indicated that
mcons1stent defenses are permissible: "When the defendant entered his plea of not guilty, he could avail himself of
all the defenses which the evidence disclosed. It would be
perfectly proper for him to say (a) I did not fire the shot; (b)
Whatever I did, I did in my own defense." Graham v. State,
98 Ohio St. 77,81-82, 120 N.E. 232 (1918).
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